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ABSTRACT: This paper describes the implications for Marxist thought of the 
work of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. In the first two periods of this 
they explained how the rise of democracy brought prosperity to Europe  and 
why the same process had not worked in Latin America because of the 
possibility of coups. The implication is that mass poverty can better be 
alleviated by safeguarding democracy rather than moving to socialism. In the 
last period A&R have formalized doubts about the efficacy of democracy in 
this role. The implication here is that Marxists should work to find a system of 
government that is immune to elite dominance. Hugo Chávez is taken as an 
example. 
  
I. Introduction 
For this paper, Marxists are people whose thought exhibits three characteristics: 
they view society in terms of economically defined classes; they think that the masses 
are exploited economically by the elite; and finally, they favour a move toward 
socialism. The Marxists, whose thought I want to consider, are Marx and Engels 
themselves, a group of Latin American Marxists and finally, Hugo Chávez. All of them 
fit this broad definition. 
Since 2000 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have written a large number of 
papers which have appeared or are about to appear in the most prestigious of 
mainstream economics journals. These articles have exhibited the first two Marxist 
characteristics but not the last. Rather than socialism, A&R have focused on democracy 
as the solution to the problems generated by the class struggle. Their work can be 
divided into three periods, in the first two they were optimistic about democracy. But in 
the most recent they are in the process of investigating why democracy can not be 
counted on to counteract exploitation. Thus the reversal of opinion of the title. 
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The most important paper of the first period is A&R (2000). This first appeared as a 
working paper in 1996 and considered the extension of democracy in 19th century 
Europe. In it they noted that the extension of suffrage both economically damaged the 
ruling elite and was partly responsible for the huge rise in the standard of living of the 
working class. They then argued that the elite were forced into this concession to avoid 
being destroyed by revolution. 
The implications of this retrospective understanding of the 19th century for the work 
of M&E, it will be argued, are the following: M&E thought that socialism was 
necessary because, under capitalism, the wage would be forced to subsistence. 
Furthermore the route to socialism was, first, to use the threat of violence to force the 
extension of suffrage, second to use democracy to implant socialism and finally to be 
ready to fight the elite when they turned to illegal means to resist the change. If the 
interpretation of A&R is accepted, then the implication is that M&E were only partially 
correct. The threat of violence was necessary for the extension of suffrage, but the elite 
accepted the power that democracy gave the workers to ameliorate the effects of 
exploitation and socialism was not necessary.  
The central contribution of the second period is A&R (2001) in which they consider 
Latin America. The current situation there is similar to that of Europe at the beginning 
of the 19th century with capitalism and wide spread poverty. Marxists generally see 
socialism as the solution. But there is no attempt to explain why the 19th century 
European solution has not worked, especially since universal suffrage is prevalent in 
Latin America. A&R provide an answer to this. If a government attempts to redistribute, 
it will fall victim to a coup. The reason why this has only occurred in Latin America is 
that there the distribution of wealth is sufficiently unequal to make it worthwhile for the 
elite to bear the costs of defending themselves in this manner. The implication of work 
of A&R of these first two periods is that, rather than seeing socialism as the solution to 
Latin American poverty, Marxists should emphasise the 19th century European 
democratic solution and concentrate on finding ways to disarm the coup weapon.  
In the third period, which dates from 2006, they have begun to question whether 
even a properly working democracy can reduce exploitation. In A&R (2006a) they 
produce a model in which the elite capture democracy. That is, there is a perfectly 
functioning democracy but the elite party regularly wins elections and imposes labour 
market rules which allow the exploitation of the workers. What are the implications of 
this for the thought of Hugo Chávez? 
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Chávez, unlike the majority of Marxists, takes democracy seriously. He thinks that, 
in Venezuela, representative democracy has been used as a tool by the elite to 
expropriate the oil revenue surplus. His solution has been to move toward participatory 
democracy. This view, that representative democracy can be a tool of exploitation goes 
strongly against received opinion which perceives it as the only legitimate form of 
government.  
The implications of the work of A&R are, first, to provide a framework that permits, 
it will be argued, an understanding of the course of events in the conflict between 
Chávez and the Venezuelan elite. But, second, and of far greater importance, it shows 
that Chávez is correct and that received opinion should be revised. That is, A&R have 
constructed an argument in the language of mainstream economics, a language that 
commands respect generally2, that shows how representative democracy can be a tool of 
economic repression and that the search for an alternative is a legitimate and important 
task.  
In the rest of the paper the above arguments are set out in detail in three sections and 
then summarised in a conclusion.  
 
II. Democracy, Revolution and Marxist Thought in 19th Century Europe.  
The paper, A&R (2000), which appeared as a working paper in 1996, represents a 
breakthrough. Its is the first analytic paper that I know of that views society in terms of 
a conflict between economically defined classes, gives democracy pride of place in this 
conflict and, finally, uses this frame work to interpret an important segment of history. 
All their other papers follow this pattern. In this section the A&R (2000) model is 
described and their interpretation of  the 19th century is given, M&E’s predictions of 
what would happen are summarised and finally, to the extent that the events differed 
from the predictions, the modifications that ought to be made to Marxist thought are 
indicated.  
1. A&R’s Interpretation of 19th Century Europe 
The central puzzle that A&R wish to solve is the following. At the beginning of the 
19th century the countries of Europe were ruled by the elite and by the end of the 
century they were governed democratically with universal suffrage. Since this change 
was hugely expensive for the elite, why did they permit it? The quick answer is that 
                                                
2 One has only to ask what is the language of instruction of economics in democracies generally. US 
textbooks were even used in Cuba for a period after the fall of the USSR.  
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democracy was conceded to avoid a revolution that would have destroyed the elite. But 
this answer hides a more complicated question. Why did the elite choose democracy 
when they could have defused the revolutionary threat with a transfer of income and, at 
the same time, kept control of the government? This is the question that A&R want to 
answer.  
In their model there are two classes, the elite and the poor, who play a repeated 
game. Initially there is elite rule and, in each period, the state is chosen randomly: it 
may or may not be a revolutionary period. If the period is non-revolutionary the elite 
rule is secure, but if the period is revolutionary the poor may destroy the elite at a cost. 
In the latter case the elite have two defences: they may either pay a bribe to the poor, or 
they may concede democracy. If they make the concession it is permanent and can not 
be taken back. But if they bribe, once the revolutionary period is over, the payment will 
cease. If the time between revolutionary periods is sufficiently long, the bribe the poor 
will demand will be large and the elite may not have the resources to pay it. In this case 
the only recourse the elite have to avoid destruction by revolution is to concede 
democracy. According to A&R, the existence of democracy in Western society turns on 
this subtle argument.  
Since the publication of the working paper a large number of papers on this theme 
have appeared. In addition, in their book (2006), A&R have amplified the model most 
notably to include the middle class. But, with some exceptions, the theme has been that 
the threat of revolution forces the concession of democracy and this, in turn, is 
responsible for an equitable distribution of income and the disappearance of mass 
poverty.3 
2. M&E in the Light of A&R’s Interpretation 
The goal of Marx and Engels was the emancipation of the workers. This section 
explains why they thought that socialism would be necessary for this and how they 
thought socialism could be brought about. Finally it considers how correct they were in 
the light of what actually happened as interpreted by A&R’s paper.  
Marx and Engels’ primary focus of interest was England and Germany. To gain 
perspective, it is helpful to have before one the movements of the real wages in these 
countries during the period that Marx and Engels were active, from 1840 to 1896. These 
                                                
3 See A&R (2000a) and Justman and Gradstein (1999) for example. Two exceptions are Galor and Moav 
(2006) and Llavador and Oxoby (2005).  
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are given in Figure 1 below. In both countries, during this period, the real wage came 
close to doubling. It should be emphasized that, while Marx and Engels were extremely  
  
Figure 1 Real Wages 
 
 
knowledgeable about the events of the labour market, the kind of data upon which these 
series are based has only recently become available.  
The evolution of Marx and Engels ideas can be traced by looking at a sequence of 
their writings: First consider The German Ideology which was written from the spring 
1845 to the of spring 1847. This is where Marx and Engels set out the theory of 
historical materialism. An important theme is that history can be viewed as a sequence 
of property relations in which socialism comes almost as a logical consequence of the 
development. The main benefit of socialism is to bring alienation to an end and poverty 
gets barely mention. Socialism is brought about by revolution, but this is not clearly 
spelled out. The following quote captures this: 
 
In order to become…a power against which men make a revolution, it (the alien 
attitude of men to their production) must necessarily have rendered the great 
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mass of humanity  “property-less” and moreover in contradiction to an existing 
world of wealth and culture (Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 48). 
With the Communist Manifesto, written between December 1847 and January 
1848, things change. It recounts the bourgeois conquest of feudalism and the coming 
victory of the proletariat. Marx has become ambivalent about how this will happen: At 
one point he writes: “The violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for 
the sway of the proletariat” (Vol. 6, p. 495).  But later he says:  
The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to 
the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy, the proletariat will 
use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie 
(Vol. 6, p. 495). 
 
The eradication of poverty rather than alienation has become the justification for 
socialism:  
The modern labourer sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of 
existence of his own class…and here it becomes evident, that the 
bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society…because 
it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within its slavery 
(Vol. 6, p. 495). 
Alienation is not mentioned.  
With The Provisional Rules of the Association (The Working Men’s International 
Association) and The Inaugural Address, both written at the end of October 1864, the 
call for socialism is toned down and poverty is emphasised. In The Rules he states 
“…the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes means…a struggle…for 
equal rights and duties and the abolition of all class rule.” (Vol. 20, p. 14). While The 
Address opens with “It is a great fact that the misery of the working masses has not 
diminished from 1848 to 1864…” (Vol. 20, p.5). And then continues for five pages with 
a detailed accounts of the bad conditions which are completely different from the mere 
dramatic references of the Manifesto 
Next, in Value, Price and Profit, written in June of 1865, there is the only explicit 
justification of socialism by Marx that I know of. Value, Price and Profit is a complete 
version of Vol. I of Capital compressed into 46 pages. In it (Vol. 20, pp. 145-6) Marx 
explains clearly that the value of labour power is culturally determined but that it has a 
minimum value that is determined by what is physically necessary to enable a working 
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man to reproduce himself,  “ The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the 
continuous struggle between capital and labour.” (Vol. 20, pp. 146). Marx then notes 
that the capitalists can create unemployment by raising the composition of capital (Vol. 
20, pp. 147-8.). And then he states: 
These few hints will suffice to show that the very development of modern 
industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the 
working man, and consequently the general tendency of capitalist production is 
not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the value of 
labour power more or less to it minimum level (Vol. 20, p. 148). 
Because of this, Marx states “They (the workers) ought to inscribe on their banner the 
revolutionary watchword, “Abolition of the wages system”.” (Vol. 20, p. 149).  
It seems to me significant that this assertion, that capitalism pushes the value of 
labour power to the physical minimum, did not appear in Vol. I of Capital that was 
published only two years later. It seems to me possible that the prolonged rise in wages 
began to cause Marx to doubt that capitalism would force the wage to the physical 
minimum.  
In The Address of the Land and Labour League of 1869 which was edited by Marx , 
the justification  for socialism is more muted:  
the ruling classes have failed to secure the industrious wages-labourer in the 
prime of his life against hunger and death from starvation…a score of London 
working men…came to the conclusion that the present economical basis of 
society was the foundation of all existing evils,-that nothing short of a 
transformation of existing social and political arrangements could avail… (Vol. 
21, p. 404).  
Here the inevitability of bad conditions under capitalism is only implicit.  
From 1870 the major issue of whether socialism should be achieved by violent or 
political means was in the forefront. I will argue that Marx and Engels´ view was a 
subtle mixture of the two. 
In his speech on the 7th anniversary on the International that he gave on September 
24 1871, Marx said:  
The Commune was the conquest of political power by the working classes. …In 
destroying the existing conditions of oppression …the only base for class rule and 
oppression would be removed. But before such a change could be affected, a 
proletarian dicture would be necessary, and the first condition of that was a 
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proletarian army. The working classes would have to conquer the right to 
emancipate themselves on the battlefield (Vol. 27, p. 634). 
But in The Resolutions of the London Conference on the International, drafted and 
moved by Marx and Engels and issued October 17th 1871 it is stated that: 
Considering that against this collective power of the propertied classes the 
working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political 
party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied 
classes: 
That this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable 
in order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end – the 
abolition of classes (Vol. 22, p. 427). 
These seemingly diametrically opposed statements can be seen to be consistent from 
Marx’s report to the Hague conference in September 1872.  
We know that institutions, customs and traditions in the different countries must 
be taken into account and we do not deny the existence of countries such as 
America, England and…Holland where workers may achieve their aims by 
peaceful means. That being true, we must also admit that for most countries on 
the continent, it is force which must lever our revolution, it is force which will 
have to be resorted to for a time in order to establish the rule of the workers (Vol. 
23, p. 255). 
Thus a simple resolution of the conflict is that the first refers to countries where force is 
necessary and the second where it is not. 
 A more subtle interpretation arises from the experience of the Commune: It was 
democratically constituted and destroyed by the forces of reaction. The army of the first 
quote might be necessary for the defence of the democratic achievements against the 
forces of reaction. This second interpretation will be seen to be consistent with a late 
quote from Engels. 
But I think that the relation between violent and political means in Marx’s thought is 
even more subtle than this. This can be seen by looking at the conflicts within the 
General Council (of The International) and later within the SPD (The Social Democratic 
Party in Germany). With respect to the General Council, Engels described these 
conflicts in a newspaper article, written after September 1872, in which he explained 
why it had been decided to move the General Council to New York. The current 
members could not continue for lack of time 
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And then there were two elements in London both striving to gain the upper 
hand in the General Council, and in such conditions they would probably have 
done so. 
One of these elements consisted of the French Blanquists, a small coterie who 
replace discernment of the real course of the movement with revolutionary talk, 
and propaganda actually with petty spurious conspiracy leading only to useless 
arrests. 
The second dangerous element in London comprised those English working 
class leaders…(who) would now play a quite different role and the activity of 
the international in England would not only come under the control of the 
bourgeois radicals, but probably under government control (Vol. 23, pp. 265-6). 
The objection to the Blanquists and the Bakuninists is straight forward: any immediate 
recourse to violent means will be defeated by the forces of the ruling class. But, in view 
of Marx and Engels’ advocacy of political means, their objection to the English working 
class leaders is less clear.  
There are, I think, two motives for this objection. The first was given by Engels in a 
news paper article of February 22 1874. He argued in favour of an independent labour 
party and against the incorporation of working men’s candidates into the Liberal Party.  
In order to get into parliament, the “labour leaders” had recourse, in the first 
place, to the votes and money of the bourgeoisie and only in the second place to 
the votes of the workers themselves. But by doing so they ceased to be working 
men’s candidates and turned themselves into bourgeois candidates (Vol. 23, p. 
614). 
But this is not a fundamental objection since there would be nothing to stop the 
“labour leaders”, once they in, from raising money in the future from workers and 
depending only on the workers vote since after the 1865 reform bill “in all big cities 
they now form a majority of the voters.”(Vol. 23, p. 613).   
Finally one sees the objection clearly in Marx and Engels’ attack on a similar 
tendency in the SPD led by Eduard Bernstein, Karl Höchberg and Karl Schramm.  
Thus in the view of these gentlemen the Social-Democratic party ought not to be a 
one sided workers’ party, but a many sided party of “all men imbued with a true 
love of mankind.” (Vol. 24, p. 264).  
Marx and Engels claim that just because the social democratic voters  
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have sense enough not to beat their heads against a wall and attempt a “bloody 
revolution” with odds at one to ten, (this does not) prove that they will, for all 
time, continue to deny themselves all chance of exploiting some violent upheaval 
abroad, a sudden wave of revolutionary fever engendered thereby, or even a 
victory won in a clash arising there from! (Vol. 24, p. 265).  
They summarise: 
For almost 40 years we have emphasised that the class struggles is the immediate 
motive force of history and, in particular, that the class struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat is the great lever of social revolution (Vol. 24, p. 
269). 
The key word here seems to me to be “lever”. An interpretation that fits well is that the 
proletariat cannot depend on “a true love of mankind” but must use the threat of 
violence to pry concessions out of the bourgeoisie.  
Returning, for the last time, to the issue of socialism as the way to emancipate the 
working class, the justification is that capitalism condemns the working class to a wage 
at the level of physical subsistence. Marx said this clearly in 1865 but not afterward so 
that he may have begun to have doubts. But Engels, two years after Marx’s death, still 
held this opinion. He admits that wages of factory hands and of workers with trades 
have improved.  
But as to the great mass of the working people…the law which reduces the value 
of labour-power to the value of the necessary means of subsistence, and the other 
law which reduces its average price as a rule to the minimum of these means of 
subsistence: these laws act upon them with the irresistible force of an automatic 
engine, which crushes them between it wheels (Vol. 26, p. 299). 
He then relates this to socialism: 
And that is the reason why since the dieing-out of Owenism there has been no 
socialism in England. With the breakdown of that monopoly, the English 
working class will loose that privileged position; it will find itself generally-the 
privileged and leading minority not excluded-on a level with its fellow-workers 
abroad. And that is the reason why there will be socialism again in England 
(Vol. 26, p. 301). 
Finally Engels provided a twist to the scenario of the achievement of socialism by 
political means which was referred to above and which is interesting in the light of what 
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has happened. As quoted by Nimtz (1999, p. 224-5) in a 1892 letter to Paul Lafargue, 
Engels wrote that universal suffrage is 
Slower and more boring than the call to revolution, but its ten times more sure, 
and what is even better, it indicates with the most perfect accuracy the day when 
a call to armed revolution has to be made; its even ten to one that universal 
suffrage, intelligently used by the worker, will drive the rulers to over throw 
legality, that is to put us in the most favourable position to make a revolution. 
3. The Implications 
Thus what is the relation between the mainstream papers and the thought of Marx 
and Engels? It has been argued that they thought first, that socialism would be necessary 
because capitalism would condemn the working class to a subsistence wage and second, 
that the way to achieve socialism was by political action backed by the treat of violence. 
The behaviour of the wage during the time that Marx and Engels were active, and 
subsequently, shows that their first idea was wrong: capitalism does not force the wage 
to subsistence and socialism is not necessary for the avoidance of mass poverty. But 
why did the wage rise? According to the mainstream papers it was, in part, due 
precisely to the political action backed by the treat of violence. Thus Marx and Engels’ 
second idea was correct in the sense that political action backed by the threat of 
violence is capable of bringing an end to poverty. It is just that it can do this under a 
regime of capitalism and democracy, and socialism is not necessary4. I think that, in a 
nutshell, these last two sentences express the lesson of 19th century Europe.  
 
III. The Failure of the European Solution in Latin America 
Latin America now is like Europe at the beginning of the 19th century in that it is a 
group of capitalist economies whose major problem is the existence of mass poverty. 
According to the lesson of 19th century Europe, the solution should be political action 
backed by the threat of violence. In fact, the threat may not be necessary because, in 
Europe, it was used to force the extension of suffrage, while in Latin American 
democracies this in general already exists. The problem with this solution is that there 
has been democracy in Latin America for approximately 100 years and mass poverty 
shows no signs of being alleviated. Thus it seems that the lesson of 19th century Europe 
is not applicable to Latin America. 
                                                
4 It is perhaps symptomatic of this that Howard and King (2000), in an article entitled “Where Marx Was 
Right”, did not include socialism.  
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1. Latin American Marxist Thought  
Since the determined resistance of the US has closed the revolutionary route, many 
Latin American Marxists see socialism, achieved by political means, as the only 
solution to mass poverty. Steve Ellner (2004) summarized the views of three of these, 
then commented and they replied.  The first of these was Marta Harnecker (2005). Of 
the three, she was the only one to explicitly state the reason for the move to socialism: 
“Free…them (the working class)… from material poverty and the spiritual misery 
which is bred by capitalism” (p. 143). However this is difficult because “If a country 
decides to put greater emphasis on programs of social development”…(the financial 
speculators withdraw) “enormous sums of capital from the country, with disastrous 
consequences” (p. 145). The only way around this is to build the trust of the people with 
small socialist projects (p. 150) that may eventually change the current configuration of 
forces (p. 149). The equation of capitalism with material poverty etc. echoes Marx’s 
1865 statement and ignores the modern experience of developed countries. And her last 
idea is similar to the current ideas of Marxists in developed countries5. It also runs up 
against the somewhat crude objection that, after an exhaustive trail in Europe, 
capitalism and democracy was virtually unanimously chosen over socialism. 
The second is James Petras (2005), who argues against a strategy in which the Left 
allies itself with the national bourgeoisie because they will not work against neo-liberal 
reforms. He first argues that the resistance of the developed capitalist countries to third 
world socialism can be overcome by exploiting differences in the international capitalist 
camp (Ellman 2004, p. 24). He then takes Lula da Silva of Brazil as an example of what 
happens to the Left if the Centre is taken as a partner: Lula financed foreign debt 
payments by cutting pensions (pp. 155-6), favoured the agro-export industry at the 
expense of the peasants (p. 157) because it generated funds for meeting debt obligation 
(p. 158), and starved the zero hunger program of funds (p.158). Why did he do this? 
Generally left parties depend on local capital (p. 153), and Lula’s campaign was largely 
financed by “big business contractors, racketeers and industrial capitalists” (p. 156). 
Since presumably it is the coalition with the centre that leads to values being 
compromised, the solution is for the left to go it alone (p. 153). This argument calls to 
mind Engels’ argument against a coalition with the reformists, and it has the same 
weakness. In particular, how can one explain what happened in Europe if the capitalists 
                                                
5 See Petith (2007) pp. 12-15. 
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are always able to buy off the left wing politicians? An alternative explanation would be 
that Lula is as far left as it is possible to be without having the government fall. To see 
this one has to ask how long Lula’s government would last if there was an exchange 
crisis because he hadn’t cut pensions, or if he tried to service the foreign debt by 
imposing a European style progressive income tax? 
The third is Jorge Castañeda who, according to Ellner (2004) thinks that the 
revolutionary road is impossible and instead wants a Centre-Left alliance whose goal 
would be  
to reform and humanize the existing capitalist structure, but without 
replacing it with a new one.  (The finance would) come from a vigorously 
enforced sales tax rather than a progressive income tax…(because) If you go 
too far they (the capitalists) will just decamp. Either there will be capital 
flight and capitalist flight - they’ll just go and live somewhere else; or 
they’ll over throw the government which they are capable of. (pp. 13-4, the 
first quote is a paraphrase by Ellner, the second is a direct quote.) 
 Note that Castañeda is explicitly repeating Engels’ warning. Later, in an 
interview with Ellner, Castañeda (2005) explained that there should be “higher taxes 
so there would be more money available for social programs” (p. 139). And with 
respect to the political realm “more responsive democracy… in the sense that 
excluded sectors can get involved …so that democracy becomes more responsive and 
consequently more consolidated” (p.139). Ellner criticises this: “whenever the centre-
left alliance has reached power in Latin America, anti-neo-liberal goals have been 
subordinated to other objectives such as the struggle against corruption, effective 
implementation of social programs and democratization.” (p. 18). It seems that he is 
criticizing the lack of opposition to privatizations, lowering of tariffs and free 
movement of capital. But there is a more basic gap in Castañeda’s program. If the 
capitalists are capable of overthrowing the government, how can the Left have any 
bargaining power in a Centre–Left coalition? That is: there is no explanation of how 
the strategies of a Centre–Left coalition and more democracy can lead to changes the 
basic configuration of power within the country.  
To summarize:  First, there is no explanation of why the European solution to mass 
poverty has not worked and thus, why socialism is necessary. It is evident that it has not 
worked, but it is potentially important to know why, and this issue has not been 
addressed. Second, there are two obstacles to the establishment of socialism or in 
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Castañeda’s case, when looked at closely, following the European route: capital 
mobility and danger of a coup. Petras presumably thinks that the problem of capital 
mobility will be neutralized by the divisions in international capitalism, while 
Harnecker feels that the small projects will not start a capital flight. But only Castañeda 
faces up to the problem that the coup weapon gives the Right the power of veto over 
social arrangements. And he has no solution to this.   
2. A&R on the Failure of the European Solution 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) extended their European model so that they could 
consider issues relevant to Latin America. In particular they provide answers to the two 
questions raised in the previous section: Why have capitalism and democracy not served 
to eradicate poverty in Latin America as they did in Europe and how can the coup 
weapon of the ruling class be nullified?  
Their model is similar to the European one. In the case that there is a dictatorship, 
when there is a revolutionary period, the poor may force the concession of democracy 
by the threat of a revolution. They then extend the model by supposing that, if there is a 
democracy, when there is a revolutionary period the ruling class can, at a cost, stage a 
coup and return the system to a dictatorship.  
Income can be redistributed by taxes, but it is argued that it is the underlying 
distribution of wealth that determines whether democracy is stable or not. If the 
distribution is extremely unequal then, when there is a democracy and the period is non-
revolutionary, the poor will vote for a heavy tax on the rich and there will be a massive 
redistribution of income. Thus, when a revolutionary period finally arrives, the rich will 
have much to gain by installing a dictatorship and will be willing to bear the cost of a 
coup. In this case democracy will not be stable. If, on the other hand, the distribution of 
wealth is not very unequal, the taxes on the rich during non-revolutionary periods will 
be low, the gains of the rich from a coup will be less than the cost and democracy will 
be stable.  
The model provides an explanation of why the European solution to mass poverty 
has not worked in Latin America. There are three types of democracy. To see this, 
consider the tax strategy of the poor. It is supposed that it is costly to collect taxes so 
that the poor would not consider taxing away all of the income of the rich. During a 
non-revolutionary period, they will choose a tax that maximises the transfer they receive 
from the rich. But during a revolutionary period there are three possibilities. First, they 
may continue to charge their optimum tax in the knowledge that, even with this high 
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tax, it will not be worthwhile for the rich to stage a coup. In this case the democracy is 
called consolidated. Second, in order that it will be optimal for the rich not to stage a 
coup, the poor may lower the tax. In this case the democracy is called semi-consolidated 
and will exhibit low taxes during revolutionary periods. Third, it may be the case that 
even a zero tax will not be sufficient to avoid a coup. The democracy, in this case, is 
called non-consolidated. It is the distribution of wealth that determines the type of 
democracy. For example, if the distribution of wealth is very unequal, the taxes in the 
non-revolutionary periods will be very high, even a zero tax during a revolutionary 
period will not be sufficient to compensate the rich and they will stage a coup; that is 
the democracy will be unconsolidated. Generally, as the distribution of wealth falls from 
equality to extremely unequally distributed, the type of democracy moves from 
consolidated to non-consolidated.   
The reason the European solution has not worked is the following. First, Europe has 
an equalitarian distribution of wealth, consolidated democracies, a tax system that 
redistributes income and, thus, has no mass poverty. Latin America, on the other hand, 
has an unequal distribution of wealth, democracies which are either semi or non-
consolidated, a tax system which is unable to redistribute income and thus mass 
poverty. Thus the basic reason for the failure of democracy in Latin America is the 
difference in the distribution of wealth.  
3. The Implications 
Note that the model supplies a foundation for the criticisms of the previous section. 
First it gives a formalization for the alternative reason, given above, for Lula’s not 
moving further to the left. Second it spells out the consequences of Castañada’s insight 
that capitalists have the ability to overthrow the government. Finally, it exposes the lack 
of any reasoned argument behind Castañada’s hope that a Centre-Left coalition with a 
more consolidated (here with a different meaning) democracy would bring an end to 
mass poverty. 
What are the implications for Marxist thought? The three lacunae were indicated 
above were: no answer to why the European solution had failed and thus why socialism 
was necessary; no solution to the coup problem; and finally no convincing way to avoid 
the effects of capital mobility. The model provides a deep insight into all of these.  
Consider the first two. When looked at closely the model parallels the position of 
Marx and Engels, but with an important difference. M&E advocated democratically 
imposed socialism and the readiness to fight when the elite turns to illegal means. A&R 
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foresee democratically imposed redistribution possibly thwarted by a coup. This is the 
parallel. The difference is that M&E thought that socialism would be necessary, but 
with hindsight A&R understand that democratic redistribution is sufficient to alleviate 
poverty. The implication for Marxist thought in Latin America is that Marxists are 
correct to emphasise political means but first, they should focus more on democratic 
redistribution since the European experience has show that socialism is not necessary 
and second, they should take account of the A&R insight and work on redistributing 
wealth since, unless the coup weapon is disarmed, any attempts to cure poverty by 
redistribution are doomed.   
Now consider capital mobility. A&R’s position on this is ambiguous. On the one 
hand they argue that capital mobility will consolidate democracies. With it, in non-
revolutionary periods, the workers will realize that high taxes will lead to capital flight 
and lower income. For this reason they will vote a lower tax, it will no longer be in their 
interests for the elite to stage a coup and the democracy will be consolidated. On the 
other hand they admit that this will lower the amount of redistribution that a democracy 
can carry out so that the balance may go either way. They call for an empirical 
investigation (2006, p. 348). Given the general perception that capital mobility has 
increased poverty6, one would expect a negative verdict, but one should keep an open 
mind.7 
The implication for Marxist thought is that capital mobility should not be thought of 
merely as an obstacle to the imposition of socialism. Rather a more balanced view is 
called for. On the one hand it may increase poverty, but on the other one might not even 
have access to the levers of democracy without it.  
  
IV. Hugo Chávez and the Reversal of Opinion 
The main characteristic of the work of A&R up to 2006 was that it gave numerous 
examples of the way a movement to democracy redistributed income from the elite to 
the citizens. This work was amplified in their prize winning book (2006). Then, without 
any warning anywhere, the last sentence of the book stated “Thus, democracy will 
                                                
6 See Weyland (2004), Hagopian (1998) and Barr (2005). 
7 An alternative way of inserting capital mobility into the model, which I favour, is the following: Extend 
the definition of a coup to include any actions of the elite that lead to a fall of the government. An 
example would be a capital fight that caused an exchange crisis which led to a fall of the government. 
With this definition capital mobility, which lowers the cost of this type of coup, would cause previously 
consolidated democracies to become semi-consolidated. With this interpretation capital mobility has no 
redeeming virtues. Lula can not solve the poverty problem because Brazil’s democracy is only semi-
consolidated due to capital mobility.  
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become more consolidated; however, for those who expect democracy to transform 
society in the same way as British democracy did in the first half of the twentieth 
century, it may be a disappointing form of democracy.“! (p. 360). After this, papers 
began to appear that, fleshing out this insight, explored the many ways that the elite may 
maintain control of society in spite of there being democracy. Two of these papers are 
especially relevant for the last 65 years of Venezuelan history. Although they are set out 
in  completely general terms they correspond to the way that Hugo Chávez understands 
Venezuela. That is, this part of the work of A&R provides an understanding, and even a 
justification, for Chávez’s Marxist vision of Venezuela and the Marxist policies he is 
attempting to carry out.  
1. The Capture of Democracy 
In (2006a) A&R develop the concept of the capture of democracy.  
a. The Model 
The model is a repeated game. There are two players or classes, the workers and the 
landed elite. The workers generally work on the land of the elite but there is home 
production as well which places a lower limit on the wage the elite can pay. There are 
two labour regimes: repressive where the elite pay the lower limit and competitive 
where they pay the marginal product, which is generally higher.  
Each stage game has two possible states: either democracy or non-democracy. The 
workers have political power which is random. The elite has political power which is 
determined non-cooperatively. Each member decides on his investment in class political 
power with the knowledge of the investment of the others but before the realization of 
the workers’ power is known. The difference between democracy and non-democracy is 
that the political power of the workers is higher in the former. In each stage game the 
class with more political power gets to make two decisions: the labour regime of the 
present stage game and the state of the following one. If the elite have more political 
power they will choose a repressive labour regime and non-democracy for the following 
period, and visa versa for the workers. Thus a sequence of stage games is generated 
where in each one there is either democracy or non-democracy and either a repressive or 
competitive labour regime. 
One would think that the workers’ chances of winning were greater under 
democracy, but this is not necessarily so. The authors illustrate this with a version in 
which, when there is democracy, the extra investment by the elite in just sufficient to 
counter balance the increase in the workers’ power so that the workers’ chances of 
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wining are the same in both states. But generally it is the case that the probability that 
the elite have more power is higher in non-democracy.  
The authors then modify the model to introduce the concept of capture. In the 
modification, as before, the side with most political power can choose the labour 
regime, but to change the state in the following stage game requires an extra margin of 
political power. The result of this is that, in democracy, the elite are willing to make a 
larger investment in the hope  of having  a sufficient margin to change the electoral 
regime in the following period. A side effect of this is that the elite are the class with 
more power with greater frequency. Thus one generally observes democracy with the 
elite in power and repressive labour conditions. This is what the authors call the capture 
of democracy.  
The authors actually have policy recommendations for avoiding this. First, generally 
they suggest policies that would raise the power of the workers. If this is raised 
sufficiently the cost to the elite of the investment in power will be greater than the 
benefit of winning so they will make no investment, in every period the workers will 
have more political power and in each period there will be democracy and a competitive 
labour regime. The second and third suggestions are to be carried out after democracy 
has been installed and without prior warning. This is because, if the elite foresee these 
policies, they will raise their investment exactly to avoid them being put in place.  These 
two policies are: first to raise the cost of the elite of investing in political power and, 
second, to raise the lower limit on the wage. This last is to lower the benefits to the elite 
of a repressive labour regime and thus make them less willing to invest in political 
power.  
b. A Typical Sequence of Periods 
In order to interpret the history of Venezuela in terms of this model, first consider a 
sequence one might observe. Start with a non-democratic state. There will be a run of 
periods where the elite are in power and labour conditions are repressive. During this 
run the elite’s investment is low since they only have to contend with a weak opponent. 
Then a low probability event occurs and the workers come to power. They choose a 
competitive labour market regime and democracy for next period. In the next period the 
elite make a large investment in political power in the hope of being able to change the 
electoral regime. Because of this they will return to power with a high probability.  
In addition to this, supposing that the workers follow A&R’s advice, during the 
period that the workers are in power one should observe the following: First, the 
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political power of workers should be increased. And second, without prior warning, the 
cost of the elite’s investment and the lower limit of the wage should both be raised. 
c. Interpretations of the Concepts 
The model does not fit Venezuela exactly. Thus a number of interpretations must be 
made. In the model income comes from agriculture and the two classes are the land 
owners and the workers. In Venezuela the most important source of income is oil, with 
a contribution, by some measures of over 20% of GDP between 1994 and 2003 
(Nakatani 2008, p. 4). Before the election of Chávez, this revenue was controlled partly 
by the state and partly by the management of the state oil company, PDVSA. From 
1958 to 1994 the state was controlled via the pact of “Punto Fijo” by a tandem of two 
parties, the AD and the COPEI.8  “The essence of the pact was to share power and 
resources among the pact’s signatories and to exclude any challengers,” (Wilpert 2007, 
p. 12)9. The second partner, PDVSA, remained largely independent of the state since 
“the (1976) nationalization of Venezuela’s oil industry … merely transferred ownership 
of the industry without transferring management or management culture and policies”  
(p. 89)10. Thus the main beneficiaries of the oil revenue were the hierarchy of the two 
political parties and the upper echelons of the oil company. Nakatani (2008, p. 6) 
summarizes this: “Before the Chávez government, the oil revenue was appropriated 
almost exclusively by the dominant classes of Venezuela. Part of this revenue was 
distributed for some privileges of the middle class and a minority of workers, especially 
those of the PDVSA.” Thus the group that consists of the politicians of the AD and the 
COPEI, the management of the PDVSA, the members of the middle class associated 
with it and the upper levels of its work force will be taken to correspond to the elite of 
the model and will be termed the elite in the description of Venezuela. Since the elite 
contains some workers, the complementary group, in the description of Venezuela, will 
be termed the citizens.11  
With respect to the labour market regimes, the issue in Venezuela is not salaries but 
the distribution of the oil revenues. Thus a repressive labour regime in the model 
corresponds to the situation in which the elite receive the oil revenues and the 
                                                
8 A non-“Punto Fijo” candidate won the election in 1994.  
9 My description of Venezuela depends largely on the works of Gregory Wilpert who is favourably 
disposed toward Chávez. To reassure the reader a bit it is worth pointing out that Noam Chomsky called 
his book “deeply informed”.  
10 When a page number appears with no reference, it will refer to Wilpert (2007). 
11 The definition is not so clean as that of the model since the elite could disappear in the case of a long 
period of citizen rule. But at least, looking at both the history and the current situation, it is clear who the 
elite are.  
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competitive one to that in which the citizens receive them. Since it corresponds to 
Chávez’s intuition, in the description of Venezuela, the former will be termed exploitive 
(although this stretches the meaning a bit) and the latter socialistic. This is in keeping 
with the sense of A&R’s model since the landlord-worker set up is merely an example 
while their focus is on how political power determines the distribution of income.  
Finally consider the electoral regimes. In the model, non-democracy and democracy 
correspond to the situation in which the workers have less and more political power. In 
the description of Venezuela I will term non-democracy as representative democracy 
and democracy as participatory democracy. This requires considerable justification. In 
the period of representative democracy 1958-1998, the citizens actually had little 
political power. 
 “…representative democracy is the kind of democracy that predominated 
during the forth republic, before the 1999 constitution, which meant the 
exclusion of ordinary citizens and their non-participation in the country’s 
political affairs. Citizens could vote once every five years and other than 
that they were expected not to get involved in politics. According to this 
analysis, the consequence was that politicians were free to do as they 
pleased since on one was looking over their shoulders. This made corruption 
and the abuse of power almost a necessary consequence of representative 
democracy ( p. 54)12 
What really requires justification is the notion that the participatory democracy that 
Chávez is trying to put in place gives the citizens more power. This is especially so 
since there is the inherent possibility that it will do just the opposite: Generally, 
throughout his book, Wilpert worries that the Bolivarian movement will fall victim to 
the Venezuelan tendencies toward patronage and clientelism. In particular he fears that 
even the communal councils, the most promising part of the participatory structure, 
could be compromised.  
The reason, though, this (the strengthening of twenty first century socialism) 
is still only a potential and not completely fulfilled is because one of the key 
issues about the communal councils has still not been resolved, which is the 
danger of patronage-clientelism. That is, as long as there is not impartial 
appeals process or other assurance that the councils’ funding does not go 
                                                
12 Although I think this is correct, the opinion is not unanimous. For example A&R (2001, p. 592) 
consider Venezuela to be a consolidated democracy.  
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only to pro-government councils, there is a very real and serious danger that 
patronage-clientelist structures will be recreated, whereby government 
benefits are exchanged for political support ( p.232). 
For this reason I do not think that it can be claimed that the citizens are certain to have 
more power.  
Rather, my justification is that this is Chávez’s aim. Very briefly Chávez extended 
the rights of the citizens in the following ways: They may organise referendums whose 
results are binding on the government; they may organise local and communal councils 
which are a form of direct democracy; they may audit the accounts of the government; 
and finally they may be involved in the appointment of government officials (pp. 53-
67). Wilpert ends his chapter on governance policy with “Chavez plans …to further 
“strengthen and create institutional mechanisms that privilege popular participation”” 
(p. 67). It may be that Chávez fails and Venezuela either becomes a left wing 
dictatorship or relapses into being a right wing dominated representative democracy. 
But in order to understand the developments in Venezuela in terms of the model it is 
sufficient that Chávez trying to give more political power to the citizens and the elite 
fear that he will succeed.  
To summarize, these interpretations imply that Venezuela has passed through the 
following periods in terms of the model: elite rule and then democracy with high elite 
investment. If the elite manage to return to power and are unable to destroy the 
participatory structure, then Venezuela will become a captured democracy.13  
d. The Events in Terms of the Model 
With these interpretations in place, now consider how the events of the last half 
century in Venezuela correspond to the hypothetical sequence that the model produces. 
From 1958 to 1998 there was elite rule maintained via representative democracy. Then 
in 1998 a low probability event occurred and Chávez won the election. One can think 
                                                
13  Actually my interpretation makes the model follow the facts to a much greater extent than it does in 
the interpretations given by A&R. They portray many Latin American countries as captured democracies. 
According to the model, the elites should be making large investments in the hope of returning the system 
to elite rule. A&R (2006a) devote pp. 50-53 to examples of capture from Latin America. There is not the 
slightest indication of a hope of returning to elite rule. Rather what one sees is a large investment when 
there is a danger of a movement to the left as in Columbia in the 1980’s when the Unión Patriótica 
suffered “the systematic murder of its candidates.” (p. 52). It fits better to consider these countries as 
having elite rule since then the examples of a movement to left calling forth a large investment in hope of 
a return to the status quo anti abound: Cuba, with the bay of pigs and the Miami Cubans; Nicaragua, with 
the contras; Chile, with the middle class disturbances and, as described below, Venezuela. However it 
must be admitted that, with this interpretation, examples of captured democracies are rare. As noted 
above, Venezuela would be a captured democracy if the right came to power but could not change the 
participatory structure.    
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of this as the citizens having more political power. Regarding the activities of the 
workers, one should observe a change in the labour market conditions and in the 
electoral rules. With respect to the former, Chávez managed to rest control of the state 
oil company from the elite and then used the revenue to finance the missions which, in 
all cases, were designed to benefit the citizens  (pp. 87-100 and pp. 120-149). With 
respect to the latter, Chávez made two types of changes. First there were those that 
maintained the representative democracy and, like the one which lengthened the 
president’s term, actually strengthened the position of the leader (p, 41). But second 
there was the implantation of the institutions of participatory democracy, for example 
the creation of local councils and communal councils. This was a transfer power from 
the officials of representative democracy to institutions that correspond to a more direct 
control by the citizens. If one interprets the first type of changes as strengthening 
Chávez, not against the citizens, but against the opposition, then one observes the 
citizens acting in accordance with the model.  
With respect to the elite, one expects to see a large increase in the investment in 
political power. Here the prediction of the model is fulfilled “con creces”. In the period 
of representative democracy the electoral expenses of the two elite parties were 
financed by the government while this was denied to the other parties (p. 74). The 
expenditure was sufficient to maintain them in power. After Chávez’s election, the 
expenditure increased enormously. They staged a general strike in 2001, a failed coup 
in 2002, an oil strike in 2002-3, a referendum on the recall of Chávez in 2004, fought a 
strong campaign against his re-election in 2006 and finally in 2008 defeated his attempt 
to reform the constitution of 1999 (pp. 18-28). The cost of this investment in political 
power was huge, especially in 2001-2003 when poverty increased from 39% to 54% of 
the population (p. 141).    
Finally A&R make policy suggestions aimed at avoiding elite control. One can see 
that some of Chávez’s polices correspond to their suggestions. Its almost as if Chávez 
had hired Acemoglu and Robinson as advisors. The first suggestion is that changes 
should be made that raise the power of the workers in democracy. The following 
interpretation shows Chávez doing exactly this. His initial project for participatory 
democracy had local planning councils that increased the political power of the citizens. 
For this interpretation, suppose these were the norm for participatory democracy. These 
councils had certain weaknesses that caused them to be relatively ineffective. In 
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response to this, the communal councils were created that remedied the weaknesses and 
gave the citizens more power (pp. 56-60). 
The second and third suggestions are to be carried out after the change to 
democracy and without previous warning. This condition is fulfilled since the 
investment of the elite pre the 1998 election would have been much larger if they could 
have foreseen what was coming. The first suggestion is that the cost for the elite of 
political power be raised. There are many examples of this, perhaps the clearest is the 
refusal to renew the licence of one of the elite’s main TV stations (pp. 223-6). The 
second suggestion is that the lower limit of the wage be raised. An example of this is 
Chávez’s land redistribution program. At this point the correspondence between the 
model and the reality is exact. This will raise the income of the peasants and make their 
exploitation by the landlords more difficult (pp. 110-115).  
Thus Chávez’s decision to implant participatory democracy, the opposition’s 
reactions and his anti-elite policies all correspond to the basic lines of A&R’s capture 
model.  
2. Civilian-Military Unity 
There is a second paper this time by Acemoglu and other co-authors, Acemoglu et. 
al. (2008), which is closely related to a particular and somewhat unusual policy of 
Chávez. Early in his career, long before he was president, an important part of his 
thinking was to create civilian-military unity. The reason was that he thought that the 
elite could use the military to suppress the citizens because it was isolated from them. 
Their unification with the citizens would make this difficult (p. 16). A& R have also 
dealt with this theme. In most papers on the topic, and also A&R’s earlier papers, the 
elite and the military have been treated as a single individual. In their most recent 
paper, with a considerable innovation, Acemoglu and his co-authors have characterized 
the military as a separate player. The views of Chávez and of Acemoglu and his co-
authors on this theme are surprisingly similar.  
a. The Military Model 
The model is a repeated game. There are three players: the elite, the military and, 
this time, the citizens. There are also four states: elite rule, democracy, military 
dictatorship and transitory democracy. The state of the game in the first period is elite 
rule. The elite choose either to mount an army or not. If they do not, there is no 
repression and in the next period there is a smooth transition to democracy. If they do, 
they must decide on a wage. The army is drawn from the citizens and the wage is 
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higher than that of the citizens and sufficiently high so that the army will not attempt to 
establish a military dictatorship via a coup against the elite rule. Once established, the 
army will try to repress any attempt to move to a democracy. This repression is only 
successful with a certain probability. If it is successful, the next period is a repeat of 
elite rule. If it fails, the next period is transitory democracy, that is, a period in which 
the military and the democratic regime coexist. If democracy survives to the third 
period, the military will be disbanded since it’s only function is to repress the citizens. 
The army has the capability of staging a coup and also the economic incentive since 
when disbanded the salaries of the former soldiers will descend to the level of the 
citizens. The citizens decide to either payoff the army or not. In the first case there will 
be no coup and in the next period the army will be disbanded. In the second case there 
will be a coup attempt which succeeds with a certain probability. If it succeeds, there 
will be a military dictatorship while if it fails, there will be democracy and the army 
will be disbanded.  
In this case the authors make no policy recommendations. But they do note that the 
existence of a foreign threat is helpful since it gives a second rational for the army, 
defence. Thus the army will not be completely disbanded under democracy and this 
reduces the bribe that the democracy has to pay to avoid a coup attempt.    
b. The Citizen-Military Events in Venezuela 
This section uses the interpretations of the previous section. The history of military 
intervention is as follows. Previous to 1948, there was representative democracy, a 
military coup in 1948 and then representative democracy was re-established in 1958. 
This endured until 1998 when the system was changed to participatory democracy 
(according to my interpretation). The first 20 years of this 40 year period were 
prosperous because of he high oil prices, the second 20 years were ones of increasing 
difficulty again because of the behaviour of oil prices. There was only one military 
intervention during this whole period. In 1989  the president, Carlos Andres Pérez  was 
forced to ask for IMF aid which he received in return for implementing the typical 
package of neo-liberal measures. There was rioting throughout the country, the 
“Caracazo”. This was repressed by the army with over 300 deaths ( pp. 9-14 and 16-
17). Thus one can consider this period one of elite rule where the military was created 
and used for repression . But first, it can hardly be said that the army was frequently 
used in this role and second, Chávez’s policy of uniting the civilians and the military 
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dates from before the “Caracazo” (pp. 15-16). Thus the origins of Chávez’s policy are a 
bit mysterious.  
When Chávez came to power he put his policy of unification immediately into 
practice. This had two aspects. First the involvement of the military in civilian life. 26% 
of the ministers were officers or retired officers and, after the elections of 2000, 41% of 
the pro-Chávez  governors came from this group. In addition to this, the army ran some 
of the welfare programs. The second aspect was the involvement of civilians in military 
life. Chávez created a reserve force of two million reservists. One of the reasons was to 
make an invasion by the US more difficult (pp. 49-53). 
The coup attempt occurred in April of 2000 and came close to succeeding. It 
involved about 20% of the military high command (Harnecker 2003, p.192). What 
seems to have happened was that a clash between pro and anti-Chávez supporters was 
organized and then manipulated to make it appear that Chávez had ordered his troops to 
fire on the demonstrators. This, in turn, was used to convince the non-involved military 
not to support Chávez. At the same time, Chávez was held incommunicado and the 
head of the chamber of commerce, Pedro Carmona, declared himself president of a 
transitional  government with the support of the part of the military behind the coup. 
This plan worked initially, but then failed as first, huge popular support for Chávez 
appeared in the streets and then, the army units, influenced partly by this and partly by 
Carmona’s high handed methods, refused to give support to the transitional government 
(Rain, Arvelaiz and Ponceleon 2003). 
What were the motives of the part of the military that had staged the coup? Chávez 
talked to them in depth, one by one. Generally he thought that there were three types of 
motives: First, there were those who were opposed to the leftist trend of Chávez’s 
policies such as the movement toward communism, the aid for the Columbian 
guerrillas, the popular militias and a tendency to weaken the armed forces. But the last 
two motives were more personal. The first there were those who were expecting 
promotion and were passed over when Chávez assumed control of the promotions. 
Second there were those in positions of power who had used these to enrich themselves 
and then had lost them (Harnecker 2003, pp. 190-191). In both cases the basic motive 
was personal and economic.  
c. The Relation of the Model to Venezuelan History 
The relation is fairly close. First the elite government during the period of 
representative government did use the military to repress the citizens although this was 
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more of an incident than habitual behaviour. Second, during the period that Chávez was 
elected, according to the model, the army  could choose to repress or not and, if the 
repression failed, there would be a transitional democracy in which both the military 
and the political power of the citizens existed. To fit the events one can say the 
repression failed. In fact there was an attempt to organize a coup, but the attempt at its 
organization failed (Hannecker 2003, p. 192). 
Third, according to the model, the citizens should either payoff the army or run the 
risk of a coup attempt. In addition there is the possibility of using an external threat to 
give the army a new role so that it will not be disbanded. Chávez’s policies come close 
to this but the fit is not exact. First, his involvement of the military in the civilian 
government can be interpreted as a payoff . But it is really a combination of this with 
giving the army a role that will permit its existence during the participatory democracy. 
This role was not envisioned by the Acemoglu and his co-authors.  Second, the creation 
of the militias does not fit the model at all. If anything Chávez should have used the 
external threat of the US to enlarge the army. His creation of the militias was perhaps 
valid since it created the possibility of an “asymmetric war” (p. 51). But according to 
the model, it would raise the payoff to the army and, in reality, it was one of the 
motives of the coup. 
Finally, the motives for the coup are exactly those predicted by the model. Some 
those who staged the coup believed that Chávez was intent on weakening the army, 
which is close to the fear that the army will be disbanded. For others the motives were 
exactly those of the model. They feared that their salaries would be reduced to the level 
of the citizens’. 
Thus once again there is a close correspondence between the military model and the 
events. Chávez’s creation of the militias does not fit well, but the model does predict 
that this would be a motive for the coup. But for the rest, the use of the military  by the 
elite for repression, the giving of a government role to the military partly as a form of 
payoff and the motives of the organizers of the coup attempt, they all fit closely with 
the model.  
3. The Implications for Marxist Thought 
First consider the implications of the military model.  This shows that the coup 
problem described in Section III is both more complicated than it appeared and 
susceptible to an additional solution. In Section III the only defence against a coup was 
to payoff the elite which was impossible if the wealth distribution was too unequal. In 
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this section it is the military, created for repression that must be paid off. This payoff 
does not depend on the distribution of wealth and thus opens other opportunities of 
avoiding a coup regardless of how unequally wealth is distributed. Chávez’s policy of 
bringing the military strongly into the government, which actually is a combination of a 
payoff and a role, accomplishes this. One can not help wondering whether the history 
of Chile would have been different if Alende had, from the beginning, made the 
military an important part of his government. In any case, the implication for Marxist 
policy is that, rather than regarding the military as an automatic ally of the elite, every 
attempt should be made to make it a partner of the citizens.  
Turning to the implications of the capture model, essentially it implies that Marx’s 
strategy must be modified. Marx’s plan of using democracy to force socialism and 
fighting the illegal response of the elite or, for that matter, A&R’s plan of using it to 
redistribute and trying to avoid a coup, may no longer work since democracy can not be 
counted on to play its role. This is because the elite may be able to control democracy, 
at least in its representative form. The implication for Marxist strategy is that some 
other form of democracy, or more generally some other mechanism, must be found 
with which the citizens may control the country. In this Chávez is exemplary, not 
because he has discovered a way to do this, but rather because he understands the 
problem and is, at least, searching for a solution.14 
 
V. Conclusion 
The central issue in the work of A&R is the question of whether democracy is 
capable of counteracting the capitalistic tendency toward inequality and mass poverty. 
The Marxist position, almost by definition, is that socialism is the solution to these twin 
evils. The position of A&R about democracy is more nuanced. They find it worked 
well in 19th century Europe but that something seems to have changed and it can no 
longer be counted on as a solution.  
What are the implications for Marxist thought? Basically that democracy should at 
least be taken seriously since it worked in 19th century Europe. If this is accepted then 
toward what type of strategy does A&R’s work point? It indicates that Marxists should 
shift their efforts from trying to bring about socialism to the twin tasks of discovering a 
                                                
14 Looking at Cuba from this angle, one sees Castro struggling to find a form of government which is both 
immune from elite dominance and sensitive to the wishes of the citizens and, at the same time, one 
observes the international community essentially calling for the restoration of elite rule.    
 28 
form of democracy that is immune to elite dominance and, at the same time, fighting to 
put it into place. If they could succeed in this, the two dangers of coups and capture 
would still remain, but at least there are weapons against these. If democracy could be 
thus modified and the anti coup and anti capture weapons used to good effect then, just 
as in 19th century Europe, mass poverty could be alleviated without the problematic 
recourse to socialism. 
If Marxists followed this path, it would seem an important part of their identity 
would be lost. But first, the project of modifying democracy is so huge and so 
important that it is a goal worthy of commitment. And second, this task corresponds 
closely to the actual work that Marx did. Rather than constructing socialist projects, a la 
Robert Owen, Marx spent his life in the thick of political battles attempting to bring 
about changes in the way capitalist democracies were run. Nimtz (1999) called Marx 
and Engels “The Unsung Heroes of the Democratic Breakthough.” It should not be hard 
to think of oneself as a Marxist when one is carrying on this work.   
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